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The recent Court of Appeal decision in Cocking v Eacott1 prompts a re-
evaluation of a judicial dogma that has consistently exempted landlords of 
“adopting” or failing to address the anti-social conduct of their tenants. The law 
would appear to be conceptually anomalous and perpetuates the inestimable 
harm suffered by claimants who are often left without a remedy even where the 
nuisance emanates from common parts over which a landlord has retained 
control. The courts have been similarly unyielding when considering alternative 
claims in negligence. 
 
Responsibilities of the landlord: adopting or continuing a nuisance 
In Malzy v Eichholz,2 Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said a landlord would not be 
liable for a tenant’s nuisance “merely because he knows of what is being done 
and does not take steps to prevent what is being done. There must be something 
which can fairly amount to his doing the acts complained of … by actual 
participation by himself”.3 In Cocking, Vos LJ stated:4 
 
“[t]o be liable for nuisance, a landlord must either participate directly in 
the commission of the nuisance by himself or his agent, or must be taken 
to have authorised the nuisance by letting the property. The fact that a 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Manchester Metropolitan University. 
1 Cocking v Eacott [2016] EWCA Civ 140; [2016] H.L.R. 15. 
2 Malzy v Eichholz [1916] 2 K.B. 308. 
3 Malzy [1916] 2 K.B. 308 at 315. In Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan (Trustees for St Joseph’s Society for 
Foreign Missions) [1940] A.C. 880; [1940] 3 All E.R. 349, Lord Wright at 904–905 explained that an occupier 
will be liable for adopting a nuisance where he "did not without undue delay remedy it when he became aware 
of it, or with ordinary and reasonable care should have become aware of it". 
4 Cocking [2016] H.L.R. 15 at [23]. 
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landlord does nothing to stop a tenant from causing the nuisance cannot 
amount to participating in it.”   
 
Therefore, adoption, or a landlord’s unwillingness to seek the repossession of 
demised premises once he becomes aware of any anti-social conduct, will not 
constitute a tenable ground of action in private nuisance. This is consistent with 
a long line of authority: for example, Smith v Scott;5 O'Leary v Islington London 
Borough;6 Mowan v Wandsworth London Borough Council7 and, most recently, 
Lawrence v. Fen Tigers Ltd (No. 2),8 when Lord Neuberger confirmed 
“authorization” (and not adoption) to be the primary determinant of landlord 
liability for tenant nuisance, such requiring “virtual certainty” or “a very high  
degree of probability” that a letting would result in a nuisance.9 So, in Smith v 
Scott, the court was unable to find such authorization in circumstances where 
Lewisham Borough Council had housed a family with a history of troublesome 
conduct in a house adjoining the claimant’s property. The tenancy agreement 
prohibited nuisance but the family proceeded to cause considerable distress to 
the claimant. Pennycuick V.C. found that the defendant Council was not liable 
as “notwithstanding that the corporation knew the Scotts were likely to cause a 
nuisance”, it would not have been “legitimate to say that the corporation 
impliedly authorized the nuisance” – in other words, it was not virtually certain 
to have resulted from the purposes for which the property had been let.10 
Although difficult to establish, the courts are at least able to contemplate the 
imposition of a responsibility for authorization. However, with adoption, there 
                                                          
5 Smith v Scott [1973] Ch. 314; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 783; [1972] 3 All E.R. 645. 
6 O’Leary v Islington LBC (1983) 9 H.L.R. 81. 
7 Mowan v Wandsworth LBC (2001) 33 H.L.R. 56; [2001] B.L.G.R. 228; [2001] 3 E.G. 133 (C.S.). 
8 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd (No.2) [2014] UKSC 46; [2015] A.C. 106; [2014] P.T.S.R. 1014 at 113, per Lord 
Neuberger. This has not been universally accepted. For example, in Page Motors v Epsom and Ewell BC 80 
L.G.R. 337; [1982] J.P.L. 572; (1981)125 S.J. 590, Ackner LJ at 347 expressed concern that earlier authority 
had not considered that the non-enforcement of a "covenant against the commission of a nuisance by their tenant 
could have resulted in their adopting his tortuous behaviour". . 
9 Lawrence [2015] A.C. 106; [2014] P.T.S.R. 1014 at 133. 
10 Smith v Scott [1972] 3 W.L.R. 783; [1972] 3 All E.R. 645 at 321. 
3 
 
exists something akin to an exclusionary rule against liability, best summed up 
by Lord Cozens-Hardy in Malzy, who described it as “an extraordinary 
proposition” that landlords could be liable by not taking proceedings against 
their tenant once they became aware that their tenant was creating a nuisance.11 
It is suggested that the rationale for this is somewhat elusive as: 
1. Only the landlord will generally be empowered to seek repossession 
under the Housing Acts 1985 (secure tenants) and 1988/1996 (assured 
tenants) (as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014). 
2. Any nuisance will often emanate from common parts, over which the 
landlord is the “occupier”, a scenario which prompted Henry LJ in 
Chartered Trust v Davies  to question whether Malzy “[was] authority for 
the proposition that the landlord is never obliged to take action himself to 
restrain those activities”.12   
 
The element of “control” as a pre-requisite of liability  
Vos LJ, in Cocking, when considering who could be liable in nuisance, 
identified three primary classes of potential defendant: (a) the wrongdoer, (b) 
the occupier, and (c) the landlord and tenant.13 Upon closer examination, it 
becomes clear that whereas the courts will not hold a landlord to account for 
adopting a tenant’s nuisance(s), they do consider it just to impose liability upon 
a wrongdoer or occupier for the conduct of trespassers or licencees, primarily 
because such is viewed as remaining in overall control of the premises.14 Unlike 
the landlord, he has not parted with possession. It was with this in mind that the 
                                                          
11 Malzy [1916] 2 K.B. 308 at 316. 
12 Chartered Trust Plc v Davies (1998) 76 P. & C.R. 396; [1997] 2 E.G.L.R. 83; [1997] 49 E.G. 135 at 139. 
13 Cocking [2016] H.L.R. 15 at [22]. 
14  In Winch v Mid Bedfordshire DC 2002 WL 1876048 at [45], Astill J defined an "occupier" of land as "the 
person who has a legal interest in possession … giving him effective control". He further stated that "if the legal 
owner can obtain immediate possession he will be liable as the occupier; if he cannot he will not" (at [37]). In 
that case, the defendant council retained control having granted only licences to travellers. 
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Court of Appeal (Arden, McFarlane, Vos LJJ) considered the potential liability 
in nuisance of the defendant property owner who, despite not living at the 
property, had permitted her daughter to reside there under a bare licence, during 
which time there occurred considerable nuisance in the form of shouting and 
excessive dog barking. The defendant had retained, de jure, possession and 
control throughout and, significantly, had secured but declined to enforce a 
possession order against her daughter. The Court of Appeal confirmed the 
defendant’s liability for having adopted the nuisance, not in her capacity as a 
landlord, but as an occupier who would “normally be responsible for a nuisance 
even if he did not directly cause it, because he is in control and possession of 
the property”.15 Essentially, the defendant, having retained such control, could 
have abated the nuisance by enforcing the possession order. In concurring with 
the judge’s reasoning at first instance, Vos LJ concluded “that Mrs Waring had 
been able to abate the nuisance but chose to do nothing”.16 Arden LJ agreed that 
the defendant “was liable in law for the nuisance caused by her daughter's dog 
because as licensor she is to be treated as in occupation of the property. She is 
not in the same position as a landlord who has parted with possession”.17 Unlike 
Vos LJ, however, she suggested that the occupier is liable simply because he 
retains control of the property, there not being a need for the intercession of 
adoption and an analogous engagement with other authority.18  
 
So, if control is indeed the true test of adoption, it would appear rational for a 
landlord to bear the responsibility for any nuisance emanating from those areas 
over which he does retain control, more specifically, common parts. 
                                                          
15 Cocking [2016] H.L.R. 15 at [25], per Vos LJ. 
16 Cocking [2016] H.L.R. 15 at [28]. Vos LJ did remind us that merely referring to an arrangement as a licence 
will not be conclusive. Whether there is in fact a tenancy will be determined by looking at the reality or 
substance of the agreement: Street v Mountford [1985] A.C. 809; [1985] 2 W.L.R. 877; (1985) 17 H.L.R. 402 at 
819, per Lord Templeman. 
17 Cocking [2016] H.L.R. 15 at [35] 
18 Cocking [2016] H.L.R. 15 at [40]. 
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Significantly, this was acknowledged (albeit in a commercial context) in 
Chartered Trust, where the court found a landlord of a shopping mall liable for 
having adopted the nuisance of a lessee. Lord Neuberger, in Lawrence, when 
considering this case, suggested that “[s]ince the landlords were in possession 
and control of the common parts, where the nuisance was occurring, the 
decision may well have been justified on orthodox grounds”.19  
 
It is on this basis, that the perfunctory dismissal of claims against landlords for 
the adoption of nuisances becomes all the more questionable, especially when 
considering the facts of the now notorious Hussain v Lancaster City Council.20  
Here, the claimants were joint owners of the freehold to a shop and living 
accommodation and were, over several years, subjected to incessant and 
malevolent racial harassment and abuse as well as assaults, firebomb attacks 
and criminal damage. Due to witness intimidation and a failure on the part of 
the courts to impose sufficiently rigid punishment on the culprits, the claimants 
brought an action against the defendant local authority. This was on the grounds 
of adoption of the nuisance by the defendant and a negligent failure to exercise 
their statutory powers under housing legislation. Whilst the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that the case raised important issues as to whether a landlord 
could be liable in negligence or nuisance for failing to prevent tenants and/or 
members of their households from committing criminal acts of harassment and 
nuisance, it concluded that the relevant acts “did not involve the tenants’ use of 
the tenants’ land and therefore fell outside the scope of the tort”.21  This would 
appear to be inconsistent with aforementioned authority and ostensibly ignored 
                                                          
19 Lawrence [2015] A.C. 106; [2014] P.T.S.R. 1014 at 114. There was an application of such orthodoxy in 
Nynehead Developments Ltd v RH Fibreboard Containers Ltd [1999] 1 E.G.L.R. 7; [1999] 02 E.G. 139 where 
it was claimed that the common lessor of retail units had failed to prevent the parking of vehicles by tenants on 
the forecourt of the claimant’s property. Weeks J held at 142 that the agent of the defendant had "consented to 
or connived at the nuisance, and Nynehead has therefore adopted it and is vicariously liable". 
20 Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] Q.B. 1; [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1142; (1999) 31 H.L.R. 164. 
21 Hussain [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1142; (1999) 31 H.L.R. 164 at [23], per Hirst LJ. 
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the possibility of the local authority having adopted or continued those 
nuisances as occupiers of the common parts, namely the roads and pavements 
from where the acts had emanated. Significantly, the Council was empowered 
to maintain the highways under an agency agreement with Lancashire County 
Council, which had further incorporated duties contained within the Highways 
Act 1980 “to protect the rights of the public to the use and enjoyment of the 
highway”,22 thereby recognizing its role as occupier. This decision would 
appear even less sustainable in light of Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire 
Council.23 There, the claimants were the tenants of a substantial farm located 
adjacent to land owned by the Council on which travellers had congregated, 
proceeding to trespass on the claimant’s farm, depositing rubbish, causing 
obstructions and criminal damage. The Court of Appeal held the Council liable 
as the nuisance had emanated from land over which it had exercised control; 
essentially, it was the occupier of the land that had been used as a “base” for the 
nuisance. In articulating the view of the court, Evans LJ suggested that “it may 
be that the correct analysis…that he is liable, if at all, for a nuisance which he 
himself has created by allowing the troublemakers to occupy his land and to use 
it as a base for causing unlawful disturbance to his neighbours”.24 A literal 
application of this principle renders it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish 
Lippiatt from Hussain. In Cocking, Vos LJ placed greater emphasis on Page 
Motors Limited v Epson and Ewell Borough Council (and to a lesser extent, 
Winch v Mid-Bedfordshire District Council)25 in adjudicating on the matter of 
adoption, an authority that would seem to fortify further any critique of 
Hussain. In that case, the local authority were dilatory in failing to remove 
travellers who were causing a nuisance to neighbouring landowners (as in 
Cocking, it secured but did not enforce a possession order, and proceeded to 
                                                          
22 Highways Act 1980 s.130(1) and (2). 
23 Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] Q.B. 51; [1999] 3 W.L.R. 137; (1999) 31 H.L.R. 1114. 
24 Lippiatt [1999] 3 W.L.R. 137; (1999) 31 H.L.R. 1114 at 61. 
25 Winch 2002 WL 1876048. 
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provide a range of facilities to the trespassers). It would appear that the only 
distinguishing factor was that in Hussain, the aggressors were tenants, whereas 
in Page and Lippiatt they were trespassers- but irrespective, in all three cases, 
the ineluctable fact is that the nuisances emanated from parts controlled by the 
defendants.26  
 
Alternative redress? 
Although described as “a different class of case”,27 Page, Lippiatt and 
Chartered Trust clearly illustrate the fallacious nature of the current law on 
adoption. There was an acknowledgement of this in Octavia Hill Housing Trust 
v Brumby,28 where the High Court upheld a refusal to strike-out a claim brought 
by a tenant for nuisances emanating from visitors to another flat whilst using the 
common parts. This was on the basis that the question as to whether there was a 
real prospect of success was to be determined upon consideration of the 
evidence at trial. This fact-sensitive approach is promising, but, as of yet, 
embryonic, and in the meantime, the failure of the courts to provide a remedy 
for adoption has been compounded by the concomitant failure of claims based 
upon other grounds, notably the failure of public landlords to exercise their 
discretionary powers to act against nuisance tenants.  
In X v Bedfordshire County Council,29 Lord Browne-Wilkinson suggested that 
the courts should only question the exercise of such a discretion where the 
decision not to take an action “is so unreasonable that it falls outside the ambit 
of the discretion conferred upon the local authority”.30 In Stovin v Wise,31 Lord 
                                                          
26 The decision in Lippiatt is not, however, without its difficulties when considering its broader import: holding 
the council liable in circumstances where their land was used as a mere "base" with the relevant acts taking 
place elsewhere, suggests that an occupier may have an obligation to control the acts of licencees off his land. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal placed considerable emphasis on Attorney General v Corke 
[1933] Ch. 89 which, it is suggested, does not necessarily provide direct authority for this proposition 
27 Mowan [2001] B.L.G.R. 228; [2001] 3 E.G. 133 (C.S.) at [14], per Sir Christopher Staughton. 
28 Octavia Hill Housing Trust v Brumby [2010] EWHC 1793 (QB). 
29 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 A.C. 633; [1995] 3 W.L.R. 152; [1995] E.L.R. 404. 
30 X v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 3 W.L.R. 152; [1995] E.L.R. 404 at 736A 
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Hoffman considered that the “minimum pre-conditions for basing a duty of care 
upon the existence of a statutory power … are first that it would …have been 
irrational not to have exercised the power”.32 This constitutes an often 
insuperable caveat, augmented by a judicial leaning towards incrementalism in 
establishing novel categories of duty of care in negligence with the key 
requirement being whether it is “just, fair and reasonable” to impose a duty.33 
With this in mind, Hussain reaffirmed that local authority landlords do not owe 
a common law duty of care to take steps to bring anti-social conduct to an end, 
as such “would place an intolerable burden on them”.34  
 
As a counterbalance to the vacuity created by this lack of redress, the public law 
remedy of judicial review could be of some assistance. In Donnelly v Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive,35 the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal declared that 
the housing executive had breached Article 8 ECHR- the right to a private and 
family life and home- by failing to address long-standing and internecine 
nuisance conduct directed towards the applicant. Essentially, the housing 
executive had not been able to prove it had taken reasonable and appropriate 
measures necessary to protect the applicant’s human rights. However, in 
Mowan, Peter Gibson LJ sounded a note of caution in respect of such 
proceedings, when opining that a public landlord might already “have taken into 
account not only property-management considerations as landlord but also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
31 Stovin v Wise [1996] A.C. 923; [1996] 3 W.L.R. 388; [1996] R.T.R. 354. 
32 Stovin [1996] 3 W.L.R. 388; [1996] R.T.R. 354 at 953 
33 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605; [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358; [1990] B.C.C. 164 at 618, per 
Lord Bridge. 
34 Hussain [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1142; (1999) 31 H.L.R. 164 at 25, per Hirst LJ. Such inflexibility is also evident 
when considering the problem from a slightly different perspective, this being that local authorities do not 
generally owe a duty to provide emergency housing for vulnerable adults who are at risk of violent anti-social 
conduct, where the public body concerned is exercising its statutory duties to re-house: X v Hounslow LBC 
[2009] EWCA Civ 286; [2009] P.T.S.R. 1158; [2010] H.L.R. 4. However, the existence of any duty to act will 
fall to be determined on a case-by-case basis: CN v Poole BC [2016] EWHC 569 (QB) at [44], per Slade J, and 
will conceivably take into account whether the housing body has assumed a voluntary responsibility towards the 
tenant so as to demonstrate the existence of Caparo "proximity": Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] 
UKHL 11; [2009] 1 A.C. 874; [2009] P.T.S.R. 778. 
35 Re Donnelly’s Application for Judicial Review [2003] NICA 55; [2004] N.I. 189. 
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social services considerations” when deciding not to take action against the 
nuisance tenant”.36 Such would serve to entrench the considerable, if not 
insuperable, difficulties faced by victims of nuisance tenants in seeking a 
remedy against a public landlord, and highlights a broader failure on the part of 
the law to develop adequate remedies in the years since Hussain. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Mowan [2001] B.L.G.R. 228; [2001] 3 E.G. 133 (C.S.) at [38]. 
